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James Duesenberry, in his seminal work, Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer
Behavior (1949), introduced the relative income hypothesis in an attempt to rationalize the
well established dierences between cross-sectional and time-series properties of consump-
tion data. On the one hand, a wealth of studies based on the 1935-36 and 1941-42 budget
surveys presented a saving ratio that increased with income. On the other hand, the data
on aggregate savings and income from 1869 to 1929 collected by Kuznets (1942) presented
a trend-less saving ratio. Duesenberry (1949) proposed an individual consumption function
that depended on the current income of other people. As a result "for any given relative
income distribution, the percentage of income saved by a family will tend to be a unique,
invariant, and increasing function of its percentile position in the income distribution. The
percentage saved will be independent of the absolute level of income. It follows that the ag-
gregate saving ratio will be independent of the absolute level of income" (Duesenberry, 1949,
pg. 3). Despite its empirical success, the relative income hypothesis was quickly replaced by
the well-known permanent income hypothesis (Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), Friedman
(1957)) as the economists’ workhorse to understand consumption behavior. According this
view the cross-sectional correlation between saving and income is driven by transitory devi-
ations from permanent income, while in the aggregate, most transitory components cancel
out, leading to the close relation between consumption and income observed in time series
data.
This paper presents a fully speciﬁed model of intertemporal choice that formalizes Due-
senberry’s intuitions. We consider an overlapping generations economy where households
dier in the initial bequest they inherit from their parents. Young households derive utility
from leisure and the dierence between their consumption and the consumption of others,
i.e. relative consumption. In this context, the resulting consumption of an agent is driven
by the comparison of his lifetime income and the lifetime income of his reference group, a
permanent income version of the relative income hypothesis. As in Duesenberry (1949), in-
dividual saving rates increase with relative income while aggregate savings are independent
of the income distribution. Positional concerns lead agents to consume and work above the
welfare maximizing levels that a benevolent central planner would choose. We propose a
simple tax schedule that induces the competitive economy to achieve the e!cient allocation.
Along the lines anticipated by Frank (2007) it consists on a progressive tax on consumption.
Despite its overwhelming theoretical dominance, the empirical case in favor of the perma-
nent income hypothesis is at best a weak one. Much of the early empirical work, Brady and
2Friedman (1947) and Mayer (1966, 1972), presents strong evidence against the proportion-
ality of savings rates. Recent empirical work casts further doubts. Browning and Lusardi
(1996) conclude that the observed positive relationship between income and saving is di!-
cult to rationalize in terms of consumption smoothing. Dynan, et al. (2004) use panel data
to instrument permanent income by education, lagged and future earnings, and measures of
consumption. Their careful analysis ﬁnds a strong positive relationship between saving rates
and lifetime income. The literature on inter-generational saving, bequests and inter-vivos
transfers, ﬁnds similar results. In recent work, Altonji and Villanueva (2007) estimate that,
at the mean of permanent earnings, parents pass on about 2.5 cents of every extra dollar of
lifetime resources to their children through bequests. Furthermore, their estimate increases
with income, hence wealthier households bequeath a larger proportion of their income that
poor households do. If we are to believe this recent body of evidence we need to depart
from the standard version of the permanent income hypothesis1.O u rm o d e ld o e ss oi na n
intuitive way, abandoning the independent preference assumption that underlies Friedman’s
analysis. The resulting behavior, a mixture of permanent and relative income components,
preserves the basic implications of the permanent income hypothesis while it is consistent
with the empirical evidence we have just described.
The assumption that preferences are independent across households, although standard
in the economic literature, is not particularly appealing. Indeed, social scientists have long
stressed the relevance of status seeking as being an important characteristic of human behav-
ior (see Cantril (1965), Schoeck (1966), Rawls (1971) and Argyle (1989)). In our discipline,
the idea that the overall level of satisfaction derived from a given level of consumption
depends, not only on the consumption level itself, but also on how it compares to the con-
sumption of other members of society, is not new. Though origins of this proposition can
be traced as far back as Smith (1759) and Veblen (1899), it was not until the work of Due-
senberry (1949) and Pollak (1976) that an eort was made to provide this idea with some
1Several authors have explored departures from the standard permanent income hypothesis to account
for the cross-sectional variation in saving rates, with dierente degrees of success. Zeldes (1989) introduces
liquidity constraints in an intertemporal optimization model. He ﬁnds that the inability to borrow against
future labor income aects the consumption of a signiﬁcant portion of the population. Ventura and Hugget
(2000) analyze the impact on saving rates of the US social security system. Samwick (1998) considers a model
where the subjective discount rate is correlated with income. Lawrance (1991) provides empirical evidence
along these lines. Gentry and Hubbard (2000) assume that enterpreneurs enjoy better access to investment
opportunities. As a result, if substitution eects dominate income eects, they will save more. Dynan, et al.
(2002, 2004) explore the eects of the introduction of bequest motives and large medical expenses associated
with health shocks. The introduction of these expenses implies that low-income households should save
more than high-income households. Finally, Carroll (2000) considers the accumulation of wealth as an end
in itself, the "capitalist spirit" model. He argues that the implications for saving of his model are virtually
indistinguishable from those obtained in a model of interpersonal comparison.
3micro-theoretic foundations. On the empirical side, Clark and Oswald (1996), using a sample
of 5,000 British workers, ﬁnd that workers’ reported satisfaction levels are inversely related
to their comparison wage rates, supporting the hypothesis of positional externalities. Neu-
mark and Postlewaite (1998) propose a model of relative income to rationalize the striking
rise in the employment of married women in the U.S. during the past century. Using a
sample of married sisters, they ﬁnd that married women are 16 to 25 percent more likely to
work outside the home if their sisters’ husbands earn more than their own husbands. Bowles
and Park (2005), using data from ten OECD economies, ﬁnd a strong positive correlation
between average working hours and the share of consumption of the richest members of
society. They interpret this result as indicative of strong emulation motives. Ravina (2007)
estimates an Euler equation derived under interdependent preferences. Her results are con-
sistent with preference speciﬁcations that place around one third of the weight on relative
consumption. Finally, Frank (1985, 2000, 2007) provides a wealth of anecdotal evidence on
the eects of positional externalities on individual behavior. On the theoretical side, there
is a large literature that explores the eects of preference interdependence for asset pricing
(Abel (1990), Gali (1994)), for short-run macroeconomic stabilization policy (Ljungqvist and
Uhlig (2000)), for the interaction between saving and growth (Carroll, et al. (1997, 2000)),
for capital accumulation (Fisher and Hof (2000), Alvarez-Cuadrado, et al. (2004), Liu and
Turnovsky (2005)), and for labor supply choices (Alvarez-Cuadrado (2007)). Finally, a grow-
ing body of experimental literature (Solnick and Hemenway (1998), Johansson-Stenman, et
al. (2002), and Alpizar, et al. (2005)) highlights the importance of relative rather than
absolute payos for economic choices.
Our paper contributes to this literature by exploring the interaction between consump-
tion externalities and income inequality. In line with previous results, relative consumption
concerns lead to ine!ciently low levels of leisure, over-working, and excessive levels of con-
sumption, over-consumption. But in contrast to earlier studies, consumption externalities
are associated with an ine!cienly low saving rate as opposed to the over-accumulation re-
sults obtained in models with an inﬁnitely lived representative agent (Fisher and Hof (2000),
Liu and Turnovsky (2005)). Intuitively in a representative agent economy with an inﬁnite
planning horizon households want to keep up with the Joneses today and in every future
date. Being forward-looking they anticipate that reducing current saving relative to their
neighbors will lead to an undesirably low level of future consumption. This mechanism is be-
hind the coupling of the over-consumption result (keeping up with the Joneses today), with
an over-accumulation result (keeping up with the Joneses in the future), reported in previous
4studies. Our framework, by restricting consumption externalities to young-age consumption,
enables us to show the opposite eect of positional concerns on the saving rate.
Finally, our work is closely related to the recent literature on self-reported well-being.
Early work by Easterlin (1974, 1995) and Oswald (1997) found dierences between the
cross-section and time-series properties of happiness data that are quite similar to those
reported on savings data more than ﬁfty years before. Self-reported well-being data shows
that within a country at a given point in time those with higher incomes are, on average,
happier. However, average happiness in developed countries has remained relatively constant
over time despite sharp increases in per capita GDP. Clark et al. (2008) highlight the
importance of interpersonal comparisons to account for the "Easterlin paradox"2. Recent
work has tried to estimate the direct impact of interpersonal comparisons on self-reported
well-being. Luttmer (2005) matches individual-level panel data on well-being from the U.S.
National Survey of Families and Households to census data on local average earnings. After
controlling for income and other own characteristics, he ﬁnds that local average earnings
have a signiﬁcantly negative eect on self-reported happiness. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005),
using data from a large German panel, concludes that the income of the reference group is
about as important as the own income for individual happiness. Dynan and Ravina (2007)
ﬁnd similar results for US households. Their estimates suggest that people’s happiness
depends positively on how well they are doing relative to the average in their geographic
area, even after controlling for the level of their own income. Our work formalizes these
insights and explores the implications of relative consumption concerns on saving and leisure
decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model. Section 3 compares
the decentralized and centrally planned solutions under an homogeneous reference group.
This section presents the basic implications of a life-cycle version of the relative income
hypothesis. Section 4 extends the previous analysis by allowing for heterogeneous reference
groups. The conclusions are summarized in Section 5, while the Appendix provides some
technical details.
2Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) extend Easterlin’s (1974, 1995) country coverage to reasses his para-
dox. Their results suggest a positive link between GDP and average levels of subjective well-being accross
countries. These authors conclude that the role for relative income comparisons as drivers of happiness
is minimal. We disagree with this interpretation of the evidence since cross-country comparisons of self-
reported well-being are problematic. We believe that a deﬁnite rebuttal of Easterlin’s paradox requires a
careful evaluation of time-series data from individual countries. In this respect, the evidence presented by
these authors is mixed.
52 The Model
Consider a small open economy that faces a given world interest rate, u. Time is discrete
and inﬁnite with w =0 >1>2>===4=
2.1 Production
Every period our economy produces a composite good that may be consumed or invested.
Output, \ , is produced combining physical capital, N> and labor>1  O= The production
function, I (N>1  O), is homogeneous of degree 1 and satisﬁes the usual Inada conditions.

























where i denotes the production function in intensive form and capital is assumed to depre-
ciate at the exponential rate =
Under the assumption that our economy is open, small and faces a constant world rate
of interest u, the domestic capital-labor ratio is pinned down by (2) with uw = u. The degree
of capital intensity, in turn, pins down the domestic wage rate at z. Any changes in labor
supply are accommodated by capital ﬂows so that the domestic wage and the interest rate
remain constant at z and u respectively. We denote the gross return to capital by U =1+u.
2.2 Households
Individuals live for two periods, "youth" and "old-age". At the end of their youth each
individual gives birth to a single ospring and therefore at any point in time there are two
generations alive. Each generation is composed of q individuals, indexed by l =1 >===>q.
Our agents are altruistic toward their children, deriving a "warm-glow" from the bequests
they leave to their descendents at the end of their lives (Adreoni (1989), Benabou (1996),
Bertola, et al. (2006)). Within a generation, individuals dier only in their initial levels
o fw e a l t h ,b e q u e a t h e db yt h e i rp a r e n t s . T h ew e a l t hd i s t r i b u t i o no fw e a l t hi np e r i o dtw is
represented by a cumulative distribution function Jw (e). The initial distribution J0 (e) is
given. Let’s focus on the l-th individual born in period w. In the ﬁrst period of his life
he is endowed with one unit of time that he allocates between leisure, ol
w,a n dw o r kH i s
6labor income, z(1  ol
w), together with his inherited wealth, el
w, is divided between current
consumption, fl
w, and saving, vl














In the second period of his life, the individual is retired. His only source of income comes
from the return on the savings he made when young, Uvl
w.H ea l l o c a t e st h i si n c o m eb e t w e e n
old-age consumption, gl
w+1, and bequest, el

















































where 0 ??1 is the subjective discount factor. The three subutility functions, x(=)>y(=)
and !(=), are assumed to be increasing, concave and to satisfy the standard Inada conditions.
Our key behavioral assumption is that during youth, the satisfaction derived from con-
sumption does not depend on the absolute level of consumption itself but rather in how
it compares to the consumption of some reference group. Following Ljungqvist and Uhlig
(2000) we adopt an additive speciﬁcation for relative consumption, ˆ fl
w = fl
w  ¯ jl
w,w h e r e¯ jl
w
is the average consumption of the reference group of the l-th individual and 0 ??1 is a
measure of the relativity concerns3. The asymmetry we introduce in our modelling of the sat-
isfaction derived from consumption along the life-cycle can be justiﬁed on several grounds.
First, the work of development psychologists and sociologists (Coleman (1961), Simmons
and Blyth (1987), Corsaro and Eder (1990)) suggests that interpersonal comparisons and
peer eects are more pronounced early in life. Second, we believe that the degree of social
interactions is higher in the ﬁrst period of our model. In this stage of life, people work,
ﬁnd partners, raise children, being exposed to, and therefore inﬂuenced by a wide variety of
social networks. To simplify, we take the extreme speciﬁcation that the strength of old-age
comparison is negligible, but it is clear that our results are still valid in an environment in
which young-age comparisons are su!ciently stronger than old-age comparisons4.
3We place restrictions on the initial endowments, J0 (e), so that everyone’s relative consumption is
positive.
4More precisely, we could assume that agents care about relative consumption in both periods of their
life, with | and r being the degree of relativity concerns while young and old respectively. The results
presented in the following sections, obtained under r =0 , are qualitatively equivalent to those obtained
73 Homogeneous Reference Group
Following most of the literature on consumption externalities (Ljungqvist and Uhlig
(2000), Liu and Turnovsky (2005)) we assume, in this section, that the reference group of
any individual is composed by all the members of his own generation5. Under this assumption
all the young households share the same reference group and therefore the reference level of
consumption is given by,
¯ j
l









The l-th individual of the generation born in period w takes as given his inherited wealth,
the factor prices and the choices of the other members of his generation, and chooses the
amount of time devoted to work, (1  ol
w), his level of saving, vl
w and the amount he will


























































































The interpretation of these conditions is standard. Nonetheless it is worth noticing the
eects of interpersonal comparisons. An increase in the consumption of the reference group,
¯ fw, increases the marginal utility of young-age consumption leading to a reduction in saving
and leisure. As we will see, equations (7)-(9) together with the budget constraints, (3) and
(4), implicitly deﬁne the optimal choices of leisure, saving and bequests as functions of the
relative income of the individual.
under the weaker restriction | A r A 0=
5See Abel (2005) for an overlapping generation model where the reference group is composed by a weighted
average of young and old households. Our speciﬁcation, in line with Frank’s (1985) arguments, limits
interpersonal comparisons to agents belonging to the same generation.









































where A0 denotes the importance of leisure when young and 0 ??1 the importance



























w  ¯ fw
(14)
Let’s begin characterizing the optimal behavior of the average household, i.e. the house-
hold inheriting the average bequest, ¯ ew. Combining (3), (4), (11), and (13) we reach the
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Replacing this expression in (15), we obtain the level of saving of the average individual
born in period w,
¯ vw =
 (1  )




  (1  )#e ¯ |w (16)
where # 
1
1+( 1 )( + )
and we can interpret e ¯ |w  z + ¯ ew as the potential life-time
income of the average agent of the generation born at w, i.e. the lifetime income of the agent
that inherits the average bequest if all of his time endowment is devoted to work. Saving is
just a constant fraction, 0 ?(1  )#?1, of this measure of lifetime income. Combining
(16) with (3) and (4) we obtain,




#e ¯ |w (18)
¯ gw+1 = U (1  )#e ¯ |w (19)
¯ ew+1 =( 1 )U (1  )#e ¯ |w (20)
We can use the results for the average household to characterize the behavior of the l-th






































w  z + el
w is the potential lifetime income, deﬁned as before, of the l-th household
of the generation born at w. Equation (22) shows that individual saving is a linear function
of individual income and average income. This linearity property ensures that the income
distribution plays no role for aggregate saving and the aggregate evolution of our economy.
It is straight-forward to solve for the remaining optimal choices as functions of individual










































w  #e ¯ |w
¤
(26)
Young-age consumption of the l-th household has a ﬁrst component that increases in
the household’s potential lifetime income and a second component that reﬂects the inﬂuence
10of interpersonal comparisons, increasing in the potential lifetime income of his reference
group. As a result saving, labor supply and bequests depend on relative income rather than
absolute income. When individual satisfaction depends on consumption comparisons across
households, as a growing body of empirical evidence suggests, the relevant variable driving
the saving and labor supply choices is the comparison between individual l’s potential lifetime
income and the potential lifetime income of his reference group. The agents populating
our economy are not only "disposed, as a rule and on the average, to be forward-looking
animals" as those in Modigliani and Brumberg (1954, p. 430) or Friedman (1957), but
are also outward-looking animals with their choices being partially driven by the choices of
other members of the community they live in. We can think of these results as a extension
of Duesenberry’s (1949) relative income hypothesis to an intertemporal framework 6.
3.2 The Life-cycle Version of the Relative Income Hypothesis
Duesenberry (1949), building on work by Brady and Friedman (1947), proposed the rela-
tive income hypothesis to rationalize the well established dierences between cross-sectional
and time series properties of consumption. On the one hand, a wealth of budget studies
presented a saving ratio that increases with income. On the other hand, Kuznets’ (1942)
time series data presented a trend-less saving ratio. Duesenberry (1949) postulated an indi-
vidual consumption function that depended on the current income of other people. Under
this hypothesis, the cross-sectional positive correlation between saving ratios and income
levels is an outcome of the relative consumption concerns (the emulation eect), while the
long run constancy of the aggregate saving rate arises because the eects of relativity con-
cerns cancel out in the aggregation. The relative income hypothesis was quickly replaced
by Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis (Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), Friedman
(1957)) as the dominant paradigm for explaining consumption behavior7. According to this
view, consumption is driven by permanent income, and as a result, saving is proportional to
life-time resources. This view explains the positive correlation between saving and income
in cross-section data by transitory deviations from permanent income. It a!rms that in
6It is worth noticing that the combination of quasi-homothetic preferences and perfect capital markets
implies that (22)-(26) are a!ne functions of the level of potential life-time income. This property of the
model ensures that the distribution of wealth does not aect the aggregate evolution of the economy. In
this sense, our approach follows Chatterjee (1994), Caselli and Ventura (2000), and Alvarez-Pelaez and Diaz
(2005)
7One should point out that Friedman’s view is more nuanced than textbooks seem to suggest “... and
ﬁnally, the evidence that we have cited seems to ﬁt it (the Permanent Income Hypothesis) somewhat better
. ...however, this evidence is by no means su!cient to justify a ﬁrm rejection of the relative income
hypothesis" (Friedman, 1957, p. 169).
11the aggregate, most transitory components cancel out, leading to the close relation between
consumption and income observed in time series data. Despite the theoretical dominance of
the permanent income hypothesis, recent empirical work ﬁnds important deviations from its
basic predictions. Browning and Lusardi (1996) conclude that the observed positive relation-
ship between income and saving is di!cult to rationalize in terms of consumption smoothing.
Dynan, et al. (2004) ﬁnd a strong positive relationship between saving rates and lifetime
income. Altonji and Villanueva (2007) report that the propensity to bequeath increases with
life-time income. Our model where agents care, not only about permanent income, but also
about relative income provides a straight forward explanation for this evidence in terms of
interpersonal comparisons.
In a representative agent economy, Liu and Turnovsky (2005) and Alvarez-Cuadrado
(2007) show that positional concerns lead households to choose levels of consumption and
working hours above the welfare-maximizing levels. Our framework, in which consumption
externalities interact with income inequality, allows for a more systematic exploration of the
dierential impact of relative consumption across the income distribution.
Since consumption (young and old) and bequests are normal goods, their levels increase
with wealth (income), although according to the standard permanent income hypothesis their
rates should be a constant fraction of life-time resources. In order to illustrate our permanent



























and the saving and bequest rates out of (actual) lifetime income as the ratio of (22) and
(26) to (27) respectively. Dierentiating these ratios with respect to wealth, measured by
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z(1 +  + )
A 0 (30)
12In the absence of interpersonal comparisons,  =0 > t h es a v i n gr a t ei sp r o p o r t i o n a lt o
lifetime income and, as in the permanent income hypothesis, independent of the life-time
resources. Once we allow for consumption externalities, A0> t h es a v i n gr a t ei n c r e a s e s
with life-time income as most empirical evidence suggests. Poor households save a smaller
proportion of their income and transfer a lower fraction of their wealth in the form of be-
quests than richer households do8. This happens despite of the fact that poor households
work longer hours than their richer neighbors9. These results are consistent with abundant
anecdotal evidence on the living conditions of low income households. For instance Newman
and Chen (2007) portray the lives of "working poor" families in America as holding multiple
jobs per person while being unable to make ends meet.
Finally, note that Duesenberry (1949) dealt with one additional empirical regularity of
consumption data: consumption is more stable than income over the business cycle. He
explained the short-run rigidity of consumption by appealing to habit formation. In our
intertemporal set up, this short-run rigidity results naturally from consumption smoothing
as in the permanent income hypothesis.
3.3 E!cient Solution
In a competitive equilibrium individual households ignore the eects that their con-
sumption choices have on the utility of other members of their generation. As a consequence,
agents’ consumption, leisure and bequest may diverge from the socially optimal levels that
would be chosen by a benevolent central planner. Let us consider a central planner that
acknowledges that individual consumption choices create distortions through their eects on
average consumption10. The planner chooses consumptions, labor eorts and bequests for
each individual within a given generation (taking their initial wealth distribution as given)


























8Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2007) explore an economy populated by inﬁnitely lived heterogeneous
households in the presence of comparative consumption. As opposed to our framework, in the inﬁnitely lived
economy poor households save more than rich ones and the presence of consumption externalities reduces
inequality in a growing economy. Their results seem at odds with the empirical evidence cited in this section.
9In a version of our model without consumption externalities, poor households will also enjoy less leisure.
The presence of consumption externalities only exacerbates this result. Bowles and Parker (2005) estimate
that almost 60% of the dierence in average working hours between Sweden and the US could be explained
in terms of interpersonal comparisons and income inequality.
10Given the focus of this paper, our planner abstracts from issues associated with intergenerational e!-
ciency. As a result we drop the time subscripts.
13subject to the individual’s budget constraints (3), (4), and (6).
Since the planner realizes that each individual contributes to the externality by a fraction
 of ﬁrst-period consumption, the dierence between the competitive and planned solution
lies in the valuation of utility of consumption while young. The planner’s counterpart of




fl>s  ¯ fs 

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q(f1>s  ¯ fs)
+ === +

q(fl>s  ¯ fs)
+ === +

q(fq>s  ¯ fs)
¸
(32)
where the superscript s denotes the planner’s choices. Comparing (14) with (32) we see that
the social marginal utility of ﬁrst-period consumption is composed of two terms. The ﬁrst
term is just the private marginal utility of consumption. The second term, in square brackets,
captures the negative impact that an additional unit of consumption of the l-th agent has on
his own welfare and on the welfare of other members of his generation through its impact on
average consumption. Since this negative impact is independent of the level of consumption






fl>s  ¯ fs> is identical for all households of
a given generation. As a result, the distortion introduced by relative consumption takes the
form of an overvaluation, by a factor
1
1  D(fl  ¯ f)
, of the marginal utility of the young
generation consumption. At this stage it is convenient to impose additional restrictions on
the model to guarantee that the social marginal utility of consumption is always positive11.
In the analysis that follows we assume these restrictions are satisﬁed.
The overvaluation of young age consumption distorts the marginal rate of substitution
between ﬁrst-period consumption and leisure, the static distortion, and the marginal rate of
substitution between ﬁrst-period consumption and saving. We refer to this second distortion
as the dynamic distortion, since it aects the willingness to shift resources into the future, i.e.
into old-age consumption and bequests. Combining (12) and (32) we obtain the following
relation between the marginal rates of substitution between consumption and leisure of the
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where the superscript g refers to the decentralised (i.e. laissez-faire) scenario.
11This restriction plays a similar role than the one placed in representative agent versions of our model
to guarantee that the marginal utility of consumption, even after taking into account external eects, is
positve. See for instance, Liu and Turnovsky (2005) assumption 1 (i). In our context this restriction implies
that 1  Dw
¡
fl
w  ¯ fw
¢
A 0=
14Similarly, combining (13), (11), (4), and (32) we reach the following relation for the
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As a result of interpersonal comparisons, households overvalue young-age consumption,
and therefore their willingness to substitute from leisure towards ﬁrst-period consumption is
too high and their willingness to postpone consumption is too low relative to the socially
desirable levels. Both distortions lead to a competitive solution characterized by young
age over-consumption, over-working and under-saving. This last result contrasts with the
standard one obtained under an inﬁnitely lived representative agent, where consumption
externalities induce over-accumulation of capital, over-saving (Fisher and Hof (2000), Liu
and Turnovsky (2005), Alvarez-Cuadrado (2007)). Intuitively, due to the assumptions that
relative concerns are constant through life-time and that each household’s planning horizon
is inﬁnite, the agents want to keep up with the Joneses today and in every future date. In
contrast, our framework, by emphasizing the prominence of consumption externalities during
young-age, reverses the eects of positional concerns on the saving rate.
Furthermore, it is important to notice the dierential impact of the distortion accross the
income distribution. Since the overvaluation factor,
1
1  D(fl  ¯ f)
, increases exponentially
with consumption (income), the relative size of the adjustment made by the planner on
the private marginal utility of consumption is larger for high income households. This just
reﬂects the fact that wealthy households, with their high levels of consumption, contribute in
a disproportionate way to average consumption, inducing substantial welfare losses on their
neighbors.
3.4 Optimal Tax Policy
A competitive economy, where young agents are concerned with relative consumption,
is characterized by over-consumption, under-saving, and over-working. Under these circum-
stances the government can restore e!ciency by means of distortionary taxation. Combining































v denote taxe rates (subsidies if negative) on labor, ﬁrst-period consump-
tion, and saving respectively. Tax revenues are returned to families in the form of lump
15sum transfers, Wl. Finding, under the proposed tax structure, the relevant marginal rates of
substitution for the competitive solution and equating them to the e!cient ones we reach,
ol (1  l
o)
(fl  ¯ f)(1+l
f)
=
ol (1  D(fl  ¯ f))
(fl  ¯ f)
(36)
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1  D(fl  ¯ f)
and l
o = l
v =0 .I nt h es e c o n do n e ,l
f =0, l
o = D(fl  ¯ f)
and l
v = D(fl  ¯ f). Since concerns for relative consumption lead to over-consumption,
over-working and under-saving it is not surprising that the optimal ﬁscal policy penalizes
the ﬁrst two activities while subsidizing the last. The ﬁrst package consists of a progressive
tax on consumption12. Since high income households contribute to a disproportionate share
of average consumption, their consumption is taxed at higher rates than the one of low
income households. Frank (2007) proposes a similar tax structure and illustrates its practical
implementation using only income and saving data.
The second package consists on a progressive tax on labor income combined with a subsidy
on saving. Wealthy households face higher labor income tax rates but their saving are also
subsidized at a higher rate.
4 Heterogeneous Reference Groups
In the previous section we characterized the behavior of an heterogeneous-agent economy
under the restrictive assumption that the reference group was common and equal to the
average household in our economy. In this context it is natural to explore the implications of
our model economy for the steady state distribution of wealth. Solving (20) with the initial






w + e" (38)
where, provided 0 ?}
(1  )U
1+ + 
? 1,a n dw h e r ee" denotes the unique stable steady
state:
12We deﬁne a progressive tax as one such that its eective rate increases with income. An alternative
deﬁnition of a progressive tax is one which its eective rate increases as the tax base increases. It is worth
noticing that we can use (17) and (23) to express the tax rates as functions of parameters and variables that
are exogenous from the standpoint of the individual household.
16e" =
}(1  #)
1  }(1  #)
z (39)
Combining (26) and (38) we reach the following dierence equation that governs the



















Given the initial condition, el
















which implies that the steady state wealth distribution collapses to a single point, with every
household in our economy eventually inheriting the average bequest, e".
This outcome, although surprising at ﬁrst sight, is just a restatement of a result presented
by Stiglitz (1969). The intuition is best understood in the case of exogenous labor. In
that case the stability condition on the evolution of bequests implies that saving out of
labor income, which is equal for all the households, is larger than f, the reference level
of consumption. Under these circumstances the proportional rate of growth of bequests is
a decreasing function of wealth and therefore the wealth distribution eventually collapses.
(See the Appendix for a formal proof.) This extreme result, that inequality disappears in
steady state, is closely related to our simplifying assumption about the composition of the
reference group.
Let us turn to the more general case where reference groups dier across households. As
we will see the main results from the previous section carry through to this more realistic
environment and the steady-state wealth distribution does not degenerate. Solving the
counterparts of (11), (12), (13), (3) and (4) for the l-th household born in period w,w h e r e
¯ jl


































































For the sake of illustration, suppose there are only two homogeneous income groups,
say K (rich) and O (poor), and the population is evenly distributed between these two
groups. Veblen (1899), Duesenberry (1949), and Frank (2007) eloquently argue that the
behavior of successful individuals or groups set the standard for the rest of the community.
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) provides convincing microeconometric evidence on the importance
of upward comparisons as a determinant of subjective well-being. In line with this evidence,
we assume that the reference group of the rich households is made up only of rich households
while the reference group of poor households is composed of a weighted average of poor and
rich households, with  being the weight placed on poor households. As a result, reference
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We can proceed sequentially. First we solve (41)-(45) together with (46), noting that
fK
w = fK
w , to obtain the optimal choices of the rich households,
f
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Once we have (48), we combine it with (47) and (41)-(45), noting that fO
w = fO
w ,t oo b t a i n
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and obtain the following relation between the saving rates, out of actual lifetime income, of
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(60)
Therefore, as in the presence of an homogeneous reference group, poor households save
and bequeath smaller fractions of their lifetime income than rich households do. It remains
to show that under heterogeneous reference groups the steady-state wealth (income) distri-
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Starting from the initial condition, eK















Combining this result with (57), we reach the following dierence equation on eO
w that
characterizes the evolution of bequests for our poor households.
e
O
w+1 = Tz + e
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195C o n c l u s i o n s
Despite the theoretical dominance of the permanent income hypothesis, there is a grow-
ing body of empirical evidence that ﬁnds important departures from its basic predictions.
Speciﬁcally, recent work by Dynan, et al. (2004) and Altonji and Villanueva (2007) pro-
vide strong evidence of a saving rate that increases with permanent income, violating the
proportionality hypothesis. Our approach departs from the standard version of the per-
manent income hypothesis in an intuitively appealing way: in line with recent evidence on
self-reported well-being, we abandon the independent preference assumption that underlies
Friedman’s analysis. We consider an overlapping-generations economy with heterogenous
wealth levels. Young households derive utility from leisure and relative consumption. In
this context, the resulting consumption of a household is driven by the comparison of his
lifetime income and the lifetime income of his reference group, a permanent income version
of the relative income hypothesis. As in Duesenberry (1949), individual saving rates increase
with relative income while aggregate savings are independent of the income distribution.
Positional concerns lead agents to consume and work above the welfare maximizing levels
chosen by a benevolent central planner. We propose a simple tax schedule that induces the
competitive economy to achieve the e!cient allocation.
Finally, one can think of our speciﬁcation as replacing Keynes’ "fundamental psychological
law" with the principle that men are disposed, as a rule and on average, to be not only
"forward-looking" but also "outward-looking" animals13.
13This refers to Keynes’ (1936, p. 96) well known observation about the "fundamental psychological law,
upon which we are entitled to depend with great conﬁdence both a priori from our knowledge of human
nature and from the detailed facts of experience, is that men are disposed, as a rule and on the average, to
increase their consumption as their income increases, but not by as much as the increase in their income."
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Under exogenous labor supply,  =0 , we construct a measure of the present value









= b fz +˜ fe
l
w +¯ fw (65)
where ˆ f 
(1 + )(1+)  2
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is the average (and marginal) propensity to consume
out of labor income, ˜ f 
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is the average propensity to consume out of inheritances
and ¯ fw 
(1  )
(1 + )(1+ (1  ))
¯ ew is a time-varying autonomous level of consumption. As in
Stiglitz (1969) individual consumption is a linear function of individual income.
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In order to explore the evolution of the distribution of wealth we can divide (67) by el
w to

















It becomes clear that the wealth distribution will eventually converge as long as (1  ˆ f)z
¯ fw A 0= Intuitively, since
¡
1  ˜ f  1
U
¢
is proportional to bequests it has no eect on the evo-
lution of the wealth distribution. On the other hand if saving out of labor income, which is
the same for rich and poor households, is greater than the reference level of consumption,
which is again the same accross households, then the bequest of a poor dynasty grows faster
than the bequest of a rich dynasty, since (1  ˆ f)z  ¯ fw represents a higher fraction of the
bequest of a poor household than of the bequest of a rich household.
Now we can ﬁnd under what conditions the "aggregate" bequest, ew,r e a c h e sas t a b l e
steady state. Summing (67) accross households we reach,
{ew+1 = U

(1  ˆ f)z  ¯ fw +
μ







21which implies that the average bequest eventually achieves a steady state i
μ





0. This stability condition together with the steady state condition, {ew+1 =0 > implies that
(1  ˆ f)z  ¯ fw A 0, so that the wealth distribution eventually collapses to a single point.
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